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Abstract. One of the most analysed business practices related to technology and innovation 
has been the coordination of the activities of rival firms and institutional bodies in Research 
and Development. This paper focuses on the analysis of the collaborative agreements in 
Research and Development. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part of the essay 
describes the terms of the Innovation, Research and Development, and cooperation activities, 
as well as their effects and importance to the successful course of the companies and the 
economy in general. The second part of the paper focuses on the beneficial role of innovative 
activities to the private business units and the market performance, enhancing, at the same 
time, the social welfare. 
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1. Definition of innovation 
 
In the last three decades, significant changes have taken place in the business 
environment all over the world. In today’s globalised markets new businesses and 
corporations have emerged, trying intensively to find new investment opportunities 
and new channels for their products. These changing conditions have imposed a great 
number of challenges to organisations in every sector. Corporations seek to find new 
resources and opportunities to develop their capabilities and obtain a wider variety of 
organizational mechanisms to become and remain more competitive than their rivals. 
Firms in every industry, and especially those related with high technology, have found 
themselves struggling to acquire and accumulate new knowledge, apply it to their 
business, and then commercialise the newly produced technology adeptly and 
profitably. 
This course is known as „innovation”, a term which includes „the search for, 
discovery” development, improvement, adoption, commercialisation of new 
processes, new products, and new organisational structures and procedures and it is a 
process that involves uncertainty, risk taking, probing, reprobing, experimenting, and 
testing. Above all, innovation is a cumulative activity that involves building on what 
went before, whether it is inside the organisation or outside the organisation, whether 
the organisation is private or public, whether the knowledge is proprietary or in the 
public domain’ definition given by Jorde and Teece (1989).  
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2. Significance of the innovative activities to the firms  
and the economy 
 
2.1 Innovation and economic progress 
 
Innovative technological progress is essential not only to business success, but 
also to the long run performance of the economy as a whole. A generation of theories 
represented by Romer (1986) take innovation as an endogenous variable which can 
explain the different national growth rates and why economies, even with different 
rates, do not converge to long-run steady state equilibrium. The reason is that the long-
run productivity decrease is avoided, due to capital accumulation through the 
qualitative-technological improvements of natural and human capital. Innovative 
actions are considered to be rather important to economic growth, development and 
welfare. Firstly, they stimulate investments which introduce new commodities and 
processes, which improve the living standards of the society. Moreover, they lead to 
new developments, which increase the comparative advantage of an economy and 
affect positively the trade performance and competitiveness of a country worldwide. 
These effects result in a greater level of economic growth.  
 
2.2 Innovation and corporate success 
 
On the other hand, innovation is rather important to an individual firm for two 
main elements, that is it has a double role in the incentives of the companies to pursuit 
and invest on it.
[1] Firstly, a corporation, which undertakes R&D programmes, 
acquires new information and knowledge to embody in the new commodities, as well 
as new production and marketing processes, ready to be employed in product and 
process innovation. As a result, through innovation, a company is able to develop 
directly new products and processes and bring them to the market acquiring an 
advantage over its competitors. Furthermore, it can enhance the ability of the firm to 
develop and maintain capabilities to absorb and expand technology information 
available by external sources, and identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge and 
technology produced elsewhere. (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) 
 
3. Cooperative relationships in R&D 
 
It is also often required that firms enter complex contracts and relationships in 
order to bring technological advances to the market and hold their competitors behind. 
Since most of the firms are not fully integrated, they tend to build bilateral or 
multilateral contracting agreements and cooperative relationships with rival firms, in 
order to commit to a common goal and access, create and diffuse technological 
knowledge, trying to exploit the benefits from cooperative manufacturing and Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities 
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commercialising of research, to gain large-scale operation benefits and to take 
advantages of sharing the associated risks.  
The range of inter-firm agreements bearing to some degree on technology is 
considerable. Co-operation and exchange of technology among firms and/or other 
research organisations can take place at a given point of R&D and/or 
commercialisation process, or cover the process as a whole and it may refer to the 
creation or just acquisition and use of knowledge. These agreements are quite flexible 
in their formation and they may take place among firms of equal or different size, 
financial strength, and market power, universities, government agencies, and 
laboratories. 
The two following tables present the range of agreements which firms may 
establish to produce, acquire, and commercially exploit technology in common, both 
in pre-competitive and competitive stage. 
Table 1 
Research and Development Cooperation in the Pre-Competitive Stage 
 
A B C 
University based co-operation 
research financed by associated 
firms (with or without public 
support) 
Government-industry co-
operative R&D projects with 
universities and public 
research institute involvement 
Research and development 
corporations on a private joint-
venture basis 
Many Partners  Many partners  Several partners 
 
Table 2 
Research and Development Cooperation in the Competitive Stage 
 
Technological cooperation  Manufacturing and/or marketing co-operation 























































Few or very 
few partners 
Few or very 
few partners 
Few or very few 
partners 
Few or very few 
partners 
Few or very 
few partners 
Few or very 
few partners Management & Marketing 
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4. Market benefits from R&D cooperation  
 
4.1. Innovation and market failures 
 
Although firms have several reasons for investing in R&D, free market 
powers are still not sufficiently effective in providing the socially optimal level of 
innovation, in the form of R&D investment expenditure in an economy. This happens 
because investments in R&D differ from regular capital investments in two main 
features:  
1.  R&D has the characteristics of a public good.
[2] Information produced by 
the R&D investments of a firm may be used, not only by the innovative firm, but it is 
also available to other firms. 
2.  R&D investments face the problem of externalities. R&D activities are 
substantially characterised by externalities or spillovers, which means that the R&D 
results of an innovative leading firm may flow to other firms, without any compensative 
payment to the firm which innovated first. Firms which invest in R&D cannot 
appropriate the complete results of their investment expenditures, and this leads to the 
reduction of the private firms’ incentives to innovate. 
These two main features associated with innovation actions discourage private 
corporations from undertaking R&D investment projects, putting an obstacle in the 
firm, as well as the economic progress itself. 
The formation of cooperative research organisations may be a remedial measure 
in providing optimal levels of knowledge, retain and promote efficiency. Through 
collaboration the companies may preserve a more competitive output market structure 
and alleviate the motivation shortcomings that appear in the provision of a public good. 
With this development, corporations are more willing to join forces and assets to engage 
themselves into an R&D program, relative to the research rivalry case, since they are 
able to achieve a more efficient outcome, avoiding spillovers and unnecessary 
duplication of effort problems, and permitting the smooth dissemination of technology 
and information, beneficial for the industry and the market altogether.  
 
4.2. R&D cooperation as solution to market failures 
 
4.2.1. Spillovers in the technology and innovation generation 
 
A spillover, or an externality, occurs when the investment activity of one 
business benefits, (positive externality), or burdens, (negative externality), another 
firm which is not part of the activity. 
During decision making about its R&D expenditure level, a corporation takes 
into consideration the effects of its decision upon its competitors. If there are 
spillovers and competitors may have free access to positive externalities which reduce 
their production costs and increase their productivity, their competitive position will Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities 
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be strengthened by taking advantage of these leakages. Firms which undertake R&D 
investments are, in case of spillovers, unable to appropriate the complete benefits of 
their activities. This lack of full appropriability may influence negatively the 
desirability of R&D investment undertaking.  
In this case, cooperation represents a solution to spillover problems of R&D 
leakages and help firms to overcome the socially inefficient level of investment by 
giving them the opportunity to undertake R&D which is highly inappropriable and 
which firms would be, otherwise, disinclined to support individually, by helping them 
to internalise the corresponding leakages. Through cooperation, participants are forced 
to pool R&D costs and commit to certain investment expenditures ex ante, that is 
before R&D is undertaken and the R&D results become available, and before any 
spillovers appear. The larger the degree of commitment of the venture members, the 
more sustainable the cooperation, and the greater the amount invested on R&D, since 
sharing of information among innovators becomes more efficient and any positive 
leakages are internalised across the participants, which leads to an increase in the 
incentives to undertake R&D investments. This effect is rather important in markets in 
which there are weak intellectual property rights and intense technological spillovers, 
which lead to a low degree of knowledge appropriability, as well as a low degree of 
innovation supply. 
 
4.2.2. Duplication of research effort and investment 
 
In the run of an innovation race, there is a great deal of possibility that 
individual firms in the same or similar industries which undertake R&D activities 
independently may follow identical or similar technological and research paths, which 
result in meaningless duplication of R&D efforts and needless wasting of resources. 
This result may be minimised or even eliminated and economising on scarce R&D 
resources will be realised, if R&D plans and research efforts are centralised and 
coordinated.  
Coordination through cooperation may improve the efficiency of the 
combined projects and reduce the duplication of effort. As Grossman and Shapiro 
(1987) argue, cooperation assures that all the partners are able to have access to any 
intermediate and final results of their combined R&D effort. Consequently, there is no 
need for any participating firm to duplicate the research activities in order to access 
knowledge already achieved by rival firms. 
 
4.2.3. R&D dissemination 
 
The problem which arises in joint research activities in a free market, as 
examined by Bhattacharya et al. (1990), is the incentive of an individual firm to reveal 
its abilities to others, when partners are not informed about each other’s technical 
capabilities. Partners, in most of the cases, try to get as much as possible from their Management & Marketing 
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partners and at the same time, they try not to give away their own competitive 
advantages. They appreciated the importance of sharing technological expertise in 
R&D activities and noticed that appropriating other firms’ intangible assets, such as 
expertise, technological and organisational knowledge, might well be an objective of 
undertaking joint R&D activities. Joint R&D efforts are more widely disseminated 
than those conducted individually. Ex ante cooperation in innovation projects 
increases their efficiency, because a single investment, once acquired, benefits more 




5. Business benefits from R&D cooperation 
 
As discussed above, cooperation has positive implications not only for the 
market as a whole, but also for the individual firms. These positive effects can be 
viewed below under the headlines economies of scale, decreased firms cost, risk and 
cost sharing.  
There is little doubt that they are rather important sources of success for an 
individual business unit, since it is able to achieve objectives that were not possible 
before the agreement. On the other hand, collaborative R&D relationships include 
several seriously problematic features and introduce costs that were not present when 
the participating business entities were independent, inhibiting the success of the 
collaboration.  
These difficulties range from communication and contractual problems to 
differing objectives of the participating firms. In particular, when previously separate 
organisations are brought under a common central management in a field, here in 
R&D, there are problems arising related to the fact that these participants are not 
homogenous, but actually different. This means that they have different perspectives 
as far as concerned with the R&D process, the aims, the needs, and the techniques and 
procedures that should be employed. There are obviously major problems involved in 
attempting to combine different organisations with their own differing business 
histories and background, their own systems of operation, their own reporting and 
control methods. 
Furthermore, since firms are under a common management in R&D 
procedures, it implies that each member has the power to intervene in the decision 
making and planning and influence them according to its interest and goals. This 
introduces important difficulties in managing and especially sharing the results and the 
benefits of joint research. The most serious challenge that cooperation has to face is 
the potential principal – agent problem. Venture members are supposed to combine 
their research forces to benefit from any complementarities in their assets. That is why 
they agree on exchanging their expertise and knowledge. In reality, this is not always 
the case. Collaborators have fears that rivals could benefit more from the 
collaboration, so as to increase their competitiveness on the product market, obtaining 
a larger market share and increased profits. That is why firms, especially the ones with Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities 
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higher innovation accumulation, are reluctant to share their knowledge and 
information with the others. On the contrary, they try to take things from the venture, 
giving as little as possible to their associates. This attitude not only does not promote 
the cooperation’s aims, but also it works on its destruction. In addition, when it comes 
to distribution of the results or other research benefits among the member firms, there 
is a great degree of possibility that some or most of them will try to influence the 
decisions according to their benefit, bringing conflicts and hostility among the 
partners, which makes the venture considerably unstable.  
 
5.1. Attainment of economies of scale 
 
Through cooperation, participants who possess complementary tangible and 
intangible assets, such as experience, information, technological resources and 
expertise, and teams of qualified researchers and personnel, are able to bring their 
complementary resources, skills, and expertise together. As Katz and Ordover (1990) 
say, through the combination of their actions, each partner firm will be assigned the 
activities in which it is more efficient, and this specialization will reduce the cost and 
increases the productivity of the project. By this combination they may take advantage 
of economies of scale and synergetic effects created in their joint R&D investment 
programmes and affect their R&D abilities. 
 
5.2. Decreased firm cost 
 
Cooperation activities may significantly contribute in increasing the profits of 
the participating firms by decreasing its production costs. Cooperation creates a new 
business unit which represents all the member companies. This unit can buy or sell 
operations in large-scale and exploit resources in large volume, realising economies of 
scale and increasing efficiency in every aspect of development and production 
operations. Moreover, joint activities may improve the cost side of a business. When 
research is undertaken by cooperation the cost of production is decreasing not only 
directly due to better transaction and production conditions, but also indirectly, by 
decreasing the cost of subsequent development research undertaken by the individual 
firms members of the research joint venture.  
 
5.3. Risk and cost sharing 
 
R&D programmes are usually characterised by a high degree of uninsured risk 
and uncertainty in the demand of their output. Due to these features, namely, high 
levels of risk and uncertainty and high rates of failure, R&D investments are not 
particularly favourably treated by the capital market, which require a high level of 
interest compensation in exchange for financing these projects, making it almost 
unprofitable to the private corporations to use the capital and credit markets to spread Management & Marketing 
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the risk and cost of their investments. This problem is not only faced by small and 
medium corporations, which do not posses the necessary funds. Even large and very 
large companies do not have the adequate and necessary resources to undertake 
projects for the development of new technologies independently, so the most apparent 
thing to do is to conduct R&D in collaboration with other firms. Cooperative research 
relationships may provide a solution to these restrains, since it has been widely 
recognised that cooperation activities have the ability to be utilised as a way to 
overcome imperfect financial markets and raise capital to fund large R&D projects. 
 
6. Social welfare effects 
 
6.1. Positive social welfare effects 
 
Innovating firms, by forming R&D alliances and by spending jointly on R&D 
may enhance the possibility of improving the quality of their product and increase 
social welfare, relative to the non-cooperative case. Society is benefited by 
cooperative R&D alliances, because on the one hand, by undertaking joint 
investments, associated risks and costs are shared among the participants, so each 
firm’s R&D incentives increase. On the other hand, the technological progress is 
stimulated by the sharing of information, knowledge, and expertise among the 
collaborators, making them able to exploit their capabilities better, combining them 
with complementary assets possessed by other firms. Furthermore, in order to acquire 
a competitive advantage, firms devote their efforts in the use of new technologies and 
the supply of new products, which increases the post-innovation competition in the 
market level, leading to lower prices, higher product quality, and larger variety, 
increasing the consumer surplus and enhancing the social welfare, a process beginning 
from the cooperation activities formation. 
 
6.2. Negative social welfare effects 
 
As discussed above, ex ante collaboration refers to joint undertaking of R&D 
activities among competitive firms, mainly through the formation of cooperation 
activities. The range of a collaborative agreement varies and can be expanded not only 
to the research field, but also to the product market. So, there are arrangements in 
which cooperation is limited only to undertaking a specific R&D project, regarding 
the sharing of costs and products of the research effort, without any further pledges, 
preserving the competition among the participating companies in the product level. 
There is also another case, in which the firms’ collaboration may be expanded also in 
the product level. Apparently, one of the main features of cooperative R&D ventures 
is that they set the potential gains from internalising technological spillovers and 
positive externalities against the potential costs of a reduction in competition in the Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities 
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market of innovative commodities and there have been concerns about whether the 
creation of cooperation is desirable from a social welfare point of view.
  
Since participants have combined their activities under a common control, it is 
possible that they exercise their combined force and curtail, resulting in restraining 
their R&D effort and competition in other stages of their connections, arising 
speculations about the outcomes of competition in final product markets. As Katz and 
Ordover (1990) say, once a group of firms has innovated successfully and has brought 
advanced products and processes in the market, it acquires a certain degree of 
bargaining command over the rival firms and it can exercise oligopolistic or even 
monopolistic power, bringing pricing distortions in the market for R&D results. Firms 
which participate in collusion including price and output levels, may behave as a 
monopoly, they limit their investment and set lower output and higher prices in a way 
to maximise their aggregate profits, which leads to a decrease in social welfare. 
To the extent in which collaborating firms establish oligopolistic or 
monopolistic power, and the research collusion is extended to the subsequent product 
market, cooperation activities may be exploited as a part of the business strategy of the 
participants and create well-defined strategic groups which pressure to decrease the 
incentives to invest, putting non-member firms at a competitive disadvantage by 
limiting spillovers of new information to competitors.  
The R&D achievements and the corresponding competitive advantage, which 
is obtained by the venture members through their collaboration, may be also utilised as 
a strong entry barrier or even a legal block, if the cooperation innovations are under 
patent authority protection against the potential entrants to the industry. Technological 
knowledge and information makes the venture members more efficient and 
competitive relative to the competitors in their industry. Moreover, the high 
investment expenditure undertaken by the venture also raises the entry costs for any 




This paper was an attempt to provide an analysis of the cooperation activities 
as an element of innovation generation. As becomes fairly apparent by the analysis in 
this paper, there are certain problems in knowledge generation and diffusion, which 
prohibit the free market mechanisms from working efficiently and result in a situation 
in which the private level of innovative activity divergences from the social optimum 
standard, resulting in the so-called ‘market failures’. As a consequence, there is need 
for certain technology policies and actions, in order to deal with this problem and 
improve the market operation. Cooperation activities may well be one of these 
policies, as shown earlier in the paper, since they can limit the negative effects of 
spillovers, duplication, and inefficient dissemination. Apart from that, we showed how 
cooperation may help individual firms to undertake R&D projects, which are usually 
characterised by high cost and uncertainty. Through R&D investments, firms are able 
to improve their products and/or productive processes, improving their efficiency and Management & Marketing 
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acquiring a comparative advantage over their rivals, explaining the significance of 
cooperation as a strategic trade policy tool, domestically and internationally. 
Through the discussion about the beneficial effects of cooperative research 
ventures, the reader of this paper gets the notion of the importance of such cooperation 
in the market and business performance. This, of course, does not mean that there are 
no negative effects, or that cooperation is an efficient tactic under any circumstances. 
Problems such as the great level of instability of cooperation as a result of the 
principal – agent problem, the high transaction and negotiation costs of collaborative 
agreements, and most importantly for the economy as a whole, the restrictions in 
competition imposed by collusion among rival firms which can be easily expanded not 
only in the production, but also the product market, demand a closer and more 
cautious look at these agreements.  
Nevertheless, this paper, even though it surely recognises these cooperation’s 
drawbacks, asserts that their positive effects are rather compensative for any problems 
and inefficiencies generated by R&D partnerships. Without these R&D relationships, 
it would be rather doubtful whether certain R&D related market failures could be 
overcome, or whether individual business organisations could achieve R&D objectives 
and generate a substantial R&D level, capable of increasing the social welfare, 
bringing efficiency and growth to the market.  
Cooperation activities are now considered as strategic-trade competitive 
methods, essential for most companies in almost every industry in supporting their 
international competitiveness. A continuously increasing number of corporations in 
every economically developed country use such strategic technological alliances, and 
especially cooperation activities, to create, access, and diffuse technological 
knowledge. The antitrust environment has now become more eased and permits 
organizations to come into strategic associations to counter the force of the increased 
international competition and the rapidly changing technologies through the expansion 
of pre-competitive and infrastructural R&D. Taking into consideration the emergence 
of global markets, cooperation activities should be dealt not as a national, but a rather 
international matter, demanding and deserving direct support in finding an appropriate 
and effective strategy for today’s deep changes. 
International technological policy should move towards a new path to build 
economic effectiveness and stimulate economic growth, supporting both basic science 
and strategically oriented research. In addition to the creation of new technologies, 
particular consideration should be dedicated to the diffusion of existing knowledge 
and innovations focusing on the ability of the firms to locate, access, adapt, and use 
new technologies. This development could be of collective nature, incorporating 
industries, government authorities, universities, and research institutes, through 
interactive relationships, to assist the authorities to engage in the needed technology 
policy goals. 
Concluding, it is believed that such an approach will result in more efficient 
and sufficient innovation generation levels, and can be rather beneficial for the 
business units and the overall economy. The suggestion made could be summarised in Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities 
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the view that cooperation activities should be treated as a core technological and trade 
policy mechanism, accompanied by special policy considerations concerning any 





                                                 
[1]  Cohen and Levinthal (1989) called this double role of innovation ‘dual role’. 
[2]  Arrow (1962) analysed on the consequences of positive externalities associated with private 
investments in industrial R&D. In case of technological leakages to competitors, the 
solution applied by the market economies is the assignment of intellectual property rights. 
The issue raised is that, since information is an intangible asset, it cannot be completely 
appropriated and leakages are inevitable due to embodiment of knowledge in commodities 
publicly commercialised and the mobility of research personnel among firms. 
Consequently, due to these leakages, the incentives for innovation investments decline, 






Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B. (1988), „Innovation in large and small firms: an empirical analysis”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 678-690. 
Adams, W.J., Encaoua, D. (1994), „Distorting the direction of technological change”, 
European Economic Review, vol. 38, no. 3-4, pp. 663-673. 
Aghion, P., Tirole, J. (1994), „The management of innovation”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 109, no. 4, pp. 1185-1209. 
Aghion, P., Tirole, J. (1994), „Opening the black box of innovation”, European Economic 
Review, vol. 38, pp. 701-710. 
Amir, R., Wooders, J. (2000), „One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and 
Research Joint Ventures”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Anand, B.N., Khanna, T. (2000), „Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances”, 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 21, no.3, pp. 295-315. 
Barber, J., White, G. (1987), „Current policy practice and problems from a UK perspective” in 
Dasgupta,P., Stoneman, P. (ed) Economic policy and technological  performance. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 24-50. 
Arrow, K.J. (1962), „The economic implications of learning by doing”, Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 29, no.3, pp. 155-173. 
D’Aspremont, C., Bhattacharya, S., Gerard-Varet, L.A. (1998), „Knowledge as a public good: 
efficient sharing and incentives for development effort”, Journal of Mathematical 
Economics, vol. 30, no.4, pp. 389-404. 
D’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A. (1988), „Cooperative and no cooperative R&D in duopoly 




Barber, J., White, G. (1987), „Current policy practice and problems from a UK perspective” in 
Dasgupta, P., Stoneman, P. (ed) Economic policy and technological  performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 24-50. 
Baumol, W.J., Ordover, J.A. (1985), „Use of antitrust to subvert competition”, Journal of Law 
and Economics, vol. 28, no.2, pp. 247-265. 
Beath, J., Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D. (1987), „Sequential product innovation and industry 
evolution”, The Economic Journal, vol. 97, pp. 32-43. 
Beath, J., Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D. (1989), „Strategic R&D policy”, The Economic Journal, 
vol. 99, pp. 74-83. 
Bensaid, B., Encaoua, D., Winckler, A (1994), „Competition, cooperation, and mergers: 
Economic and policy issues”, European Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 637-650. 
Bernstein, J.I., Nadiri, M.I. (1988), „Interindustry R&D spillovers, rates of return, and production 
in high-technology industries”, American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 429-434. 
Bhattacharya, S., Glazer, J., Sappington, D.E.M. (1990), „Sharing productive knowledge in 
internally financed R&D contests”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 39, no.2, 
pp. 187-208. 
de Bondt, R., Wu, C. (1997), „Research Joint Venture cartels and welfare”, in  Poyago- 
Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, cooperation, research and development: The economics 
of Research Joint Ventures, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 39-56. 
Brander, J.A., Spencer, B.J. (1983), „International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy”, 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 50, pp. 707-722. 
Brander, J.A., Spencer, B.J. (1984), „Strategic commitment with R&D: the symmetric case”, 
The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 14, pp. 225-235. 
Bresnahan, T.F., Salop, S.C. (1986), „Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint 
ventures”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 155-175. 
Casiman, B. (2000), „Research Joint Ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric 
information”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 18 , no. 2, pp. 283-314. 
Chesnais, F. (1988), „Technical cooperation agreements between firms”, STI Review, vol. 4, 
pp. 51-119. 
Cohen, L. (1994), „When can government subsidize Research Joint Ventures? Politics, 
economics, and limits to technology policy”, American Economic Review, vol. 84, no. 2, 
pp. 159-163. 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A. (1989), „Innovation and learning: the two faces of R&D”, The 
Economic Journal, vol. 99, pp. 569-596. 
Dasgupta, P. (1988), „The welfare economics of knowledge production”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 1-12. 
Dasgupta, P., Stiglitz, J. (1980), „Industrial structure and the nature of innovative activity”, The 
Economic Journal, vol. 90, pp. 266-293. 
Dixit, A. (1988), „A general model of R&D competition and policy”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 317-326. 
Dussauge, P., Hart, S., Ramanantsoa, B. (1992), Strategic technology management, John Wiley 
and Sons, English edition, London.  
Economides, N., White, L.J. (1994), „Networks and compatibility implications for antitrust”, 
European Economic Review, vol. 38, no. 3-4, pp. 651-662. 
Gandal, N., Scotchmer, S. (1993), „Coordinating research through Research Joint Ventures”, 




Geroski, P.A. (1993), „Antitrust policy towards co-operative R&D ventures”, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 58-71. 
Greenlee, P., Cassiman, B. (1999), „Product market objectives and the formation of Research 
Joint ventures”, Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 115-130. 
Grossman, G.M., Shapiro, C. (1986), „Research Joint Ventures: An antitrust analysis”, Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organisation, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 315-337. 
Grossman, G.M., Shapiro, C. (1987), „Dynamic R&D competition”, The Economic Journal, 
vol. 97, pp. 372-387. 
Hagedoorn, J., Link, A.N., Vonortas, N.S. (2000), „Research partnerships”, Research Policy, 
vol. 29, no. 4-5, pp. 567-586. 
Hinloopen, J. (2000), „Strategic R&D cooperatives”, Research in Economics, vol. 54, no. 2, 
pp. 153-185. 
Harris, R.G., Mowery, D.C. (1990), „New plans for Joint Ventures”, The American Enterprise, 
pp. 52-55. 
Jacquemin, A. (1988), „Cooperative agreements in R&D and European antitrust policy”, 
European Economic Review, vol. 32, pp. 551-560. 
Jaffe, A.B. (1986), „Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms’ 
patents, profits, and market value”, American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 984-1001. 
Jorde, T.M., Teece, D.J. (1989), „Innovation, cooperation, and antitrust: balancing competition 
and cooperation”, High Technology Law Journal, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-113. 
Jorde, T.M., Teece, D.J. (1990), „Innovation and cooperation: Implications for competition and 
antitrust”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 75-96. 
Joshi, S., Vonortas, N. (1997), „Dynamic cooperation in R&D” in Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) 
Competition, cooperation, research and development: The economics of Research Joint 
Ventures, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 159-191. 
Kabiraj, T., Mukherjee, A. (2000), „Cooperation in R&D and production: a three-firm 
analysis”, Journal of Economics, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 281-304. 
Kamien, M.I., Muller, E., Zang, I. (1992), „Research joint ventures and R and D cartels”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 1293-1306. 
Kamien, M.I., Zang, I. (1993), „Competing Research Joint Ventures”, Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy, vol. 2, pp. 23-40. 
Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D. (1993), „Market R&D allocations when research paths are product 
specific”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 341-353.  
Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D. (1997), „Technology policy: A selective review with emphasis on 
European policy and the role of RJVs”, in Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, 
cooperation, research and development: The economics of Research  Joint Ventures, 
MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 13-38. 
Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D. (1998), „Endogenous spillovers and the performance of Research 
Joint Ventures”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 333-357. 
Katz, M.L. (1986) “An analysis of cooperative Research and Development”, Rand Journal of 
Economics, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 527-543. 
Katz, M.L., Ordover, J.A. (1990), „Research and Development cooperation and competition”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp. 137-203. 
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C. (1987), R&D rivalry with licensing or imitation, American Economic 




Kay, N.M. (1991), „Industrial collaborative activity and the completion of the internal market”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 29, pp. 347-362. 
Kay, N.M. (1999), The boundaries of the firm, critiques, strategies, and policies, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, London.  
Kesteloot, K., de Bondt, R. (1993), „Demand-creating R&D in a symmetric oligopoly”, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 171-183. 
Kesteloot, K., Veugelers, R. (1997), „R&D cooperation between asymmetric partners”, in 
Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, cooperation, Research and Development: The 
economics of Research Joint Ventures. MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 97-125. 
La Manna, M.M.A. (1990), Research versus Development: optimal patenting policy and joint 
ventures in a three-stage model, University of Leicester, Department of Economics, 
Discussion Paper, no. 135. 
Levin, R.C. et al. (1987), „Appropriating the returns from industrial Research and 
Development”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 3, pp. 783-820. 
Levin, R.C. (1988), „Appropriability, R&D spending, and technological performance”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 424-428. 
Levin, R.C., Reiss, P.C. (1988), „Cost-reducing and demand-creating R&D with spillovers”, 
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 538-556. 
Leyden, D.P., Link, A.N. (1999), „Federal laboratories as research partners”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 575-592. 
Martin, S. (1994) Industrial economic analysis and public policy, 2
nd ed., MacMillan, New 
York. 
Morasch, K. (2000), „Strategic alliances as Stackelberg cartels- concept and equilibrium 
alliance structure”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 18, pp. 257-282. 
Motta, M. (1992), „Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 643-662. 
Motta, M. (1996), „Research Joint Ventures in an international economy”, Ricerche 
Economiche, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 293-315. 
Mytelka, L.K., Delapierre, M. (1987), „The alliance strategies of European firms and the role 
of ESPRIT”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, pp.  231-253. 
Neary, J.P., O’Sullivan, P. (1999), „Beat’em or join’em? Export subsidies versus international 
Research Joint ventures in oligopolistic market”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 
101, no. 4, pp. 577-596. 
Nelson, R.R. (1988), „Modelling the connections in the cross section between technical 
progress and R&D intensity”, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 478-485. 
OECD (1986) Competition policy and joint ventures, Paris. 
Ordover, J.A. (1991), „A patent system for both diffusion and exclusion”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 5, no.1, pp. 43-60. 
Ordover, J.A., Baumol, W.J. (1988), „Antitrust policy and High-Technology industries”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 13-34. 
Ordover, J.A., Willig, R.D. (1985), „Antitrust for high technology industries: Assessing RJVs 
and mergers”, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 28, pp. 311-333. 
Parker, J.E.S. (1978), The economics of innovation. The national and multinational enterprise 
in technological change. 2
nd ed., Longman, London. 
Peck, M.J. (1986), „Joint R&D: The case of Microelectronics and Computer Technology 




Pepall, L. (1997), „Imitative competition and public policy”, in Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) 
Competition, cooperation, Research and Development: The economics of Research Joint 
Ventures, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 57-71. 
Petit, M.L., Tolwinski, B. (1999), „R&D cooperation or competition?”, European Economic 
Review, vol. 43, pp. 185-208. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1995), „Equilibrium and optimal size of a Research Joint Venture in an 
oligopoly with spillovers”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 209-226. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1997), „Research Joint ventures and product innovation: Some welfare 
aspects”, Economics of innovation and new technology, vol. 5, no.1, pp. 51-73. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) (1997), Competition, cooperation, Research and Development: 
The economics of Research Joint Ventures, Macmillan Press Ltd, London. 
Reich, R.B., Mankin, E.D. (1986), „Joint ventures with Japan give away our future”, Harvard 
Business Review, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 78-86. 
Reynolds, R.J., Snapp, B.R. (1986), „The competitive effects of partial equity interests and 
joint ventures”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 141-153. 
Roller, L.H., Tombak, M.M., Siebert, R. (1997), Why firms form Research Joint Ventures: 
Theory and Evidence. Centre for Economic Policy Research, discussion Paper: 1654. 
Romer, P. (1986), „Increasing returns and long-run growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 94, no. 5, pp. 1002-1037. 
Rosenkranz, S. (1996), Simultaneous choice of process and product innovation, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper: 1321. 
Salant, W.S., Shaffer, G. (1998), „Optimal asymmetric strategies in Research Joint Ventures”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 195-208. 
Scherer, F.M. (1984), Innovation and growth, Schumpeterian perspectives, The MIT Press, 
London. 
Scherer, F.M. (1994), Competition policies for an integrated world economy, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C. 
Schmalensee, R., Willig, R. (1989), (ed) Handbook of industrial organization. North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Shapiro, C. (1985), „Patent licensing and R&D rivalry”, American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 
No. 2, pp. 25-30. 
Shapiro, C., Willig, R.D. (1990), „On the antitrust treatment of production Research Joint 
ventures”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 113-130. 
Solow, R.M. (1957), „Technical change and the aggregate production function”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 312-320. 
Stenbacka, R., Tombak, M. (1997), „Commitment and efficiency in Research Ventures”, in 
Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, cooperation, Research and Development: The 
economics of Research Joint Ventures, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 138-158. 
Steurs, G. (1997), „Market integration and the benefits of national versus international R&D 
cooperation”, in  Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, cooperation, Research  and 
Development: The economics of Research Joint Ventures, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 
pp. 72-96. 
Stoneman, P. (1983), The economic analysis of technological change, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Stoneman, P. (1995), (ed) Handbook of the economics of innovation and technological change, 




Stoneman, P., Vickers, J. (1988), „The assessment: The economics of technology policy”, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. i-xvi. 
Suzumura, K. (1992), „Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in an oligopoly with 
spillovers”, American Economic Review, vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 1307-1320. 
Teece, D.J. (1989), „Inter-organizational requirements of the innovation process”, Managerial 
and Decision Economics, Special Issue, pp. 35-42. 
Teece, D.J. (1992), „Competition, cooperation, and innovation: Organizational arrangements 
for regimes of rapid technological progress”, Journal of Economic  Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 18, pp. 1-25. 
Van Long, L., Soubeyran, A. (1997), „Greater cost dispersion improves oligopoly profit: 
asymmetric contributions to Joint Ventures”, in Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (ed) Competition, 
cooperation, Research and Development: The economics of Research  Joint Ventures. 
London: MacMillan Press Ltd, pp. 126-137. 
Vickers, J. (1985), „Pre-emptive patenting, joint ventures, and the persistence of oligopoly”, 
International Journal of Industrial organization, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 261-273.  
Vonortas, N.S. (1991), Cooperative research in R&D –intensive industries, Avebury, 
Aldershot. 
Vonortas, N.S. (1997), Cooperation in Research and Development, Norwell, MA, Kluwer, 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands. 
Vonortas, N.S. (1997), „Research Joint Ventures in the U.S.”, Research Policy, vol. 26, no. 4, 
pp. 577-595. 
Vonortas, N.S. (1999), „How do participants in Research Joint Ventures diversify?”, Review of 
Industrial Organization, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 263-281. 
Vonortas, N.S. (2000), „ Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D”, Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, vol.10, no. 1-2, pp. 243-271. 
Wallsten, S.J. (2000), „The effects of government-industry R&D programmes on private R&D: 
The case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program”, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 82-100. 
Yi, S.S., Shin, H. (2000), „Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, vol. 18, pp. 229-256. 
Zhigang, T., Changqi, W. (1997), „On the organization of cooperative Research and 
Development: Theory and Evidence”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 
vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 573-596. 
Ziss, S. (1994), „Strategic R&D with spillovers, collusion, and welfare”, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 375-393. 
 